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CASES NOTED
descendants of adopted children to inherit from the adopting parents, making
no distinction between adopted and natural children in such matters.6 The
court reasoned that Texas gave appellant's mother the status of legal heir,
citing several Texas decisions 7 to support its finding. These cases involved
the question of inheritance rights of parties adopted in Texas as to property
in which Texas law determined the right to inherit. Having already determined
that appellant's mother had been legally adopted under Texas law, the court
should not have considered itself bound by decisions, as here California law
determines the right to inherit.
The court also relied on Shaver v. Nash.8 In that case one adopted under
the Texas statute 9 later moved to Arkansas and there claimed the enlarged
inheritance rights granted by that state to those adopted under its own law.
The court held that Texas law governed both his status as an adopted child
and his right to inherit. However, most jurisdictions differentiate between the
status created by the act of adoption, and the separate and incidental inheritance
rights emanating from this status.'9 Since this court professes to follow the
majority view, reliance on the Shaver case appears erroneous.
There would seem to be no such status as that of a partially adopted child;
a child is either adopted or not. Furthermore, the law of inheritance is a mere
incident to adoption without signficance outside the state of its enactment."'
The contract theory propounded by the California court appears to have
been unnecessary. The decision did not have to rest solely on a few words
fortuitously incorporated into the adoption agreement.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RIGHT OF
STATE TO PROHIBIT UNION SECURITY CONTRACTS
Defendants were convicted by a North Carolina court for violating a
state statute I making it illegal to discriminate against union or non-union men
6. In re Smith's Estate, 73 Cal. App. 2d 291, 166 P.2d 74 (1946) ; In re Estate of
Hebert, 42 Cal. App. 2d 664, 109 P.2d 729 (1941) ; In re Moore's Estate, 47 P.2d 533 (Cal.
Civ. App. 1942).
7. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
8. 181 Ark. 1112, 29 S. W.2d 298 (1930).
9. See note 3 supra.
10. In re Riemann's Estate, 124 Kan. 539, 262 P. 16 (1927) ; Anderson v. French,
77 N. H. 509, 93 Ati. 1042 (1915) (overruling in effect, though not expressly, Meader v.
Archer, 65 N. H. 214, 23 Atl. 521 (1889) ; GoooarCi, CONFIc'S OF LAWS 384 (2d ed.
1938). Contra: Meader v. Archer, supra; In re Sunderland's Estate, 60 Iowa 732, 13
N. W. 655 (1883).
11. In re Riemann's Estate, supra (where the Kansas Court expressly reversed its
prior position) ; Calhoun v. Bryant, supra.
1. N. C. Laws 1947, c. 328 § 2 ("Anv agreement or combination between any em-
ployer and any labor union or labor organization whereby persons not members of such
union or organization shall be denied the right to whrk for said employer, or whereby
such membership is made a condition of employment or continuation of employment by
such employer or whereby any union or organization acquires an employment monopoly
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in the hiring of employees.2 The conviction having been affirnied by the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina, an appeal was taken, one ground being that
the statute deprived the defendants of their liberty to contract and there was
a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The sane issue was also involved in a Nebraska
case,3 and, because of the substantial identity of the questions involved in the
two cases, the Supreme Court decided theni together. Held, that states may
pass laws protecting the right to work of non-union, as well as union, men as
proper exercise of their police power and these laws do not violate the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conviction affirmed. Lincoln
Federal Labor Union No. 19129, American Federation of Labor v. North-
western Iron & letal Co.; Whitaker v. State of North Carolina, 69 Sup. Ct.
251 (1949).
One of the earlier cases which showed the Court's regard for the in-
dividual's right to contract was Allyeyer v. State of Louisiana.4 Lbuisiana had
enacted a statute forbidding persons to transact business with marine insurance
companies that had not complied with the statute. The statute was declared
unconstitutional as taking away the liberty to contract without due process of
law.
Also illustrating the limitations placed upon the state's general police
power are the decisions declaring statutes unconstitutional which attempted to
regulate hours of employment,r or to deny the enployer the right to discharge
employees because of membership in a labor union.6
The principal cases are an extension of a general trend allowing the right
to contract to be limited when that right conflicts with a reasonable exercise of
police power by the states.7 The beginning of this trend can be seen in the de-
cisions of Nebbia v. People of Ne- York 8 and West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,9 where it was established that states can legislate on what are found
to be injurious practices in their internal connercial and business affairs, so
long as their laws do not contravene some specific federal constitutional pro-
hibition, or some valid federal law. In the Nebbia case, the Court upheld a
in any enterprise, is hereby declared to be against the public policy and an illegal com-
bination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in the State of North Carolina.").
See FLA. CoNsT. DECLARATION OF FruiTS § 12 (as amended 1944).
2. Whitaker v. State of North Carolina, 228 N. C. 332, 45 S.E.2d 860 (1947), 34 VA.
L. REV. 476 (1948).
3. Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, American Federation of Labor v. North-
western Iron & Metal Co., 149 Neb. 507, 31 N.W.2d 477 (1948). See American Federation
of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S 582 (1946).
4. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
5. Lochner v. State of New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1907); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915).
7. See Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, American Federation of Labor v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.; Whitaker v. State of North Carolina, supra at 256-257.
8. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
9. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) ; see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941).
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statute fixing the price of milk, stating that the right to contract is guaranteed
by the Constitution, but is subject to public regulation when the public need
so requires. The West Coast Hotel case upheld a state statute setting a minimum
wage for women, as a proper exercise of the police power.
With the growth of the labor movement,'" the unions gained recognition.
The right to prevent employers from discriminating against them by the use
of "yellow dog" contracts was recognized when these contracts were declared
unenforceable as against public policy by the ?orris-LaGuardia Act in 1932."
In the principal cases the unions sought to have the statutes in controversy
declared unconstitutional because they alleged that such statutes would deprive
the employer and union of the right to contract freely. It would appear that
the same result would be reached either under the Taft-Hartley Act or the
Wagner Act. Section 8(3) 12 of the Wagner Act stated that closed shop
agreements were legal as long as the parties went through the steps required
by the act. 13 It should be interpreted in the light of a senate committee
report 14 stating that the bill did nothing to facilitate closed shop agreements
or to make them legal in any state where they might be illegal, indicating that
Congress, at that time, thought the state police power adequate to regulate
labor contracts.
The Taft-Ilartley Act in section 14(1)) provides that nothing in the act
will be interpreted as meaning that the Federal Government authorizes any
form of union security contract in states or territories which have laws prohib-
iting them. That states now have regulatory police power to control labor-
management contracts is indicated by a recent case. 15 This decision validated
a state law more restrictive on labor unions than the provision in the Taft-
Hartley Act, on the basis that congressional intent was to leave to the states
the police power to regulate further their own labor problems.
The decision in the principal cases was unanimous. It now appears that
any reasonable state regulation of labor-management contracts will be upheld
under the police power of the state as not violative of due process.
10. See Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, American Federation of Labor v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.; Whitaker v. State of North Carolina, su pra at 263
(concurring opinion).
11. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1946).
12. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (3) (1946). (Nothing in the act or in
any other stature of the United States, shall preclude an .mployer from making an agree-
ment with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein
if such labor organization is the representative of the employees.)
13. See National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F.2d 448, 457 (C.C.A.
1st 1938).
14. SEa. REp. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1935).
15. Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co., v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Boar.
17 U.S.L. WE K 4241 (March 7, 1949).
